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Lessons Learned from a Full-Scale
Bioterrorism Exercise
During May 20-23, 2000, local, state, and
federal officials, and the staff of three hospitals
in metropolitan Denver, participated in a
bioterrorism exercise called Operation Topoff.
As a simulated bioterrorist attack unfolded,
participants learned that a Yersinia pestis
aerosol had been covertly released 3 days
earlier at the city’s center for the performing
arts, leading to >2,000 cases of pneumonic
plague, many deaths, and hundreds of second-
ary cases. The exercise provided an opportunity
to practice working with an infectious agent
and to address issues related to antimicrobial
prophylaxis and infection control that would
also be applicable to smallpox or pandemic
influenza.
The sequence of events and the exact date
of the exercise were not specified. However, the
probable weekend and possible bioagents were
suggested, which enabled us to begin prepara-
tions approximately 8 weeks ahead. Prepara-
tions included temporary appointments to the
governor’s 19-person Expert Emergency Epi-
demic Response Committee, which was created
by enactment of a bioterrorism and pandemic
influenza response law on March 15, 2000;
recruitment of 25 epidemiologic and emergency
management personnel from the 1,050 employ-
ees of our department and assignment to
disaster response teams (e.g., surveillance, field
investigation, and emergency management
coordination); and establishment of a command
center by reserving conference rooms and
installing telephone, computer, and television
equipment. Colorado’s bioterrorism and pan-
demic influenza response law was not enacted
to prepare for the exercise, but proved ex-
tremely useful. We recommend that state
health agencies review their statutory authority
and evaluate whether these laws would be
adequate to deal with the threats of
bioterrorism and pandemic influenza. During
the exercise, we were provided information
either from other participating agencies or from
exercise controllers, and it was our task to
investigate and respond. The staff reviewed
mock medical records, analyzed laboratory
specimens, interviewed patients, conducted
meetings and group conference calls to assess
surveillance data and decide on the next steps,
drafted public health and executive orders,
made written requests to federal officials for
specific assistance, participated in news confer-
ences, and packaged mock antibiotics for
distribution at a prophylaxis clinic. By the end
of day one, 783 cases and 123 deaths from
plague had been reported from 16 hospitals
(three participating hospitals and 13 simulated
facilities). By the end of day two, 1,871 cases
and 389 deaths were attributed to pneumonic
plague, with 307 patients requiring ventilatory
support. Cases were reported from six states
outside Colorado. By the end of day three, 3,700
cases and 950 deaths were reported, including
at least 780 secondary cases.
The exercise required state health depart-
ment personnel to develop new working rela-
tionships. Although hospitals and local and
state health agencies often collaborate with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in
controlling an epidemic, we were unaccustomed
to working closely with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the U.S. Attorney for the District
of Colorado, the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency, the Regional Office of the U.S.
Public Health Service, and the Colorado Office
of Emergency Management. Although lines of
authority were clear, much time was spent in
consultation and debate through scheduled
bridge calls. Many persons joined these calls,
and decision-making became inefficient, al-
though not impossible. In a true incident, a
central location for face-to-face meetings should
be large enough to accommodate representa-
tives from all agencies involved, but one diffi-
culty encountered with arranging such meet-
ings was that each agency seemed most com-
fortable in its own command center.
Another lesson we learned concerned our
own organization. In addition to the surveil-
lance, field investigation, and emergency
management coordination teams, we needed
teams to address laboratory testing, mass
fatalities, legal problems, information technol-
ogy, infection control, public and professional
communications, and antibiotic and vaccine
administration. During a disaster, no routine
agency business can be conducted, as all em-
ployees are involved in the public health re-
sponse. Finally, activities cannot depend on the
direction of one or two key persons, such as the
executive director and the state epidemiologist;
other skilled, informed persons must be able to653
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assume leadership roles. An electronic database
documenting events, decisions, and requests for
resources should be maintained. These logs
enable staff to monitor the epidemic and the
public health response rapidly.
In Colorado, where plague is endemic, we
are familiar with the public health management
of single plague cases, but the magnitude of the
simulated epidemic and the fact that infection
was spreading from person to person after a
short (2- to 3-day) incubation period quickly
overwhelmed the available resources. The
challenge to our surveillance system was not in
detecting the outbreak but rather in maintain-
ing surveillance at each of the 22 acute-care
hospitals in metropolitan Denver. Our hospital
surveillance system usually relies on reporting
by infection control practitioners, but during
the exercise these practitioners had many
additional responsibilities. In a true bioterrorist
attack, emergency response teams of state or
local health department employees should be
set up and sent to each hospital to monitor
cases and provide information to a central
command center.
As more cases were identified, an antici-
pated issue emerged: who should receive
antimicrobial prophylaxis? The governor’s
committee debated whether to limit prophylaxis
to close contacts of infectious cases or offer it
more widely (e.g., to all health-care workers,
first responders, and public safety workers and
their families) to gain the support and partici-
pation of key workers. The committee decided
on the latter approach, but not unanimously.
The process of isolating plague patients
until they are no longer contagious and identi-
fying close contacts is typically straightforward.
Isolation, however, was not possible during this
exercise. The hospitals had too many patients
and worried-well persons and too few health-
care workers and empty rooms to permit
isolation of pneumonic plague patients. Case
reporting was delayed, and there were too few
trained public health workers to conduct
interviews and locate contacts in a timely
manner. As a result, an executive order was
issued quarantining all persons in metropolitan
Denver in their homes. With infection control in
the general population supposedly managed by
the order, we could turn our attention to secur-
ing additional supplies, staff, beds, and equip-
ment for the hospitals.
However, quarantining two million persons
is not simple. Essential workers must be
identified, be given prophylaxis and protective
barriers, and be permitted to do their jobs.
Other members of the community can stay in
their homes only a few days before they need
fresh supplies of food. Therefore, a one-time,
blanket quarantine order is unlikely to be
successful and cannot be enforced unless these
and many other issues are addressed. The
hospitals were quite demanding in their re-
quests for reinforcements, and we made great
efforts to assist them. However, by day three of
the exercise it became clear that unless control-
ling the spread of the disease and triage and
treatment of ill persons in hospitals receive
equal effort, the demand for health-care ser-
vices will not diminish. This was the single
most important lesson we learned by participat-
ing in the exercise.
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